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INTRODUCTION

A young man, 25-years-old, decides to donate his sperm to earn some
extra money. He makes an appointment at a clinic where he eventually
donates. His sperm now sits in a freezer at a sperm bank. Flash forward
six months when a 35-year-old female, who has always wanted a child
but has never been able to conceive, decides it is time to start a new
chapter in her life and have a child on her own. She goes to the same
sperm bank and looks at the available donor profiles which include the
donor's medical history and genetic test summary, as well as his age,
ethnicity, hobbies, and talents. She reaches a picture of an attractive
young man, age 25, with brown hair and a nice smile. She looks through
his profile and finds that his ethnic background matches hers and they
have many hobbies in common. She decides this is the one. She
undergoes a procedure called in vitro-fertilization and gives birth nine
months later to a baby girl. Little does that sperm donor know that he is
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now a father. His sperm is then chosen by another woman months later,
and yet again a year after that. Unbeknownst to him, within seven years,
the donor is the biological father of fifteen children.
Curious about his donation, he eventually decides to contact the sperm
bank and find out if he was ever chosen as a donor. Stunned by the news
that fifteen procedures were successful, he is unsure what he should do
now. Now a successful 33-year-old, he feels responsible for these
children and has a lot to offer them-he could give them a comfortable
home, an education, and money. Should he search for his biological
children? Would they want to meet him too? Does he have any legal right
to these kids at all?
This Note considers and analyzes this last question: Do sperm donors
have parental rights to their biological' children conceived through in
vitro-fertilization? To answer this question, this Note begins by
discussing the history of in vitro-fertilization and the different kinds of
sperm donors. Next, it explains the existing state laws, or lack thereof,
regarding the parental rights of sperm donors. Finally, this Note analyzes
common law that supports the conclusion that states must have more
uniformity with in vitro-fertilization laws and decisions in order to put
sperm donor parentage issues to rest. With this new revolutionary
technology in reproduction, the law also needs to revolutionize.
I. HISTORY OF IN VITRO-FERTILIZATION
In vitro-fertilization ("IVF"), surrogacy, and gestational carriers are
some of the different types of assisted reproductive technology.'
Specifically, Patrick Steptoe, a practicing gynecologist, and Robert
Edwards, a professor of human reproduction at Cambridge University,
introduced IVF in the 1970s. 2 Steptoe and Edwards created IVF for
women who had trouble conceiving due to damaged or blocked fallopian
tubes. 3 IVF is a procedure where the sperm and egg are fertilized "outside
of the body," in a petri dish. 4 The embryos are conceived when viable
male sperm and female eggs are combined in the petri dish with a solution
of saline and nutrients which is then incubated-similar to the conditions
of the female uterus. 5

1. Different types of assistedreproductive technology (ART), GEOSALUD (Aug. 12, 2013),
https:/www.geosalud.com/infertil ity/different-types-of-assisted-reproductive-technology.html.
2. Tian Zhu, In Vitro Fertilization,THE EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA (July 22, 2009),
https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/vitro-fertilization.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See In Vitro Fertilisation(IVF), MY VIRTUAL MED. CTR., https://www.myvmc.com/
treatments/in-vitro-fertilisation-ivf/ (last modified July 22, 2015).
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A. The Woman's Process
During the early years of IVF, the process was very demanding for
women, much more so than today. 6 For example, women were required
to spend three to four weeks as inpatients during which their urine was
collected every three hours to monitor their hormone levels.7 During this
time, this process was the only way to monitor hormones, and it resulted
in the women being constantly awakened in the middle of the night.8
Now, physicians give hormone therapy to women two weeks before
retrieving the eggs to increase the likelihood of retracting healthy eggs. 9
Women are no longer treated as inpatients, but as day patients with no
"three-hourly urine collections." 10 To determine when the eggs are ready
for fertilization, women undergo ultrasounds and blood tests.1 1 Once the
eggs have reached their "optimal time," 12 they are retracted and placed in
a petri dish for fertilization.1 3 Once the egg and sperm are fertilized in the
petri dish, the fertilized eggs are placed in the uterus for implantation.14
On avera e, seven to nine eggs are fertilized in the petri dish and become
embryos. ' The more embryos placed in the uterus, the greater the chance
of pregnancy 16 However, the transfer of many embryos increases the risk
of multiple pregnancies (e.g., the "Octomom");1 7 therefore, the transfer
of more than two embryos is discouraged.1 8 Some of these fertilized eggs
are placed in the uterus, while the others are frozen for future use in case
the embryos fail to implant.1 9 This process of freezing the eggs is called
6. Kate Brian, The amazing story of IVF: 35 years and five millions babies later, THE
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jul/12/story-ivf-five-

million-babies.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Zhu, supra note 2.
10. Brian, supra note 6.
11. Zhu, supra note 2.
12. Zhu, supranote 2 (explaining that optimal time is defined as "when the eggs are almost
ready for fertilization").
13. Zhu, supra note 2.
14. Zhu, supra note 2 (explaining that in cases of male fertility problems, a physician may
manually inject a sperm into an egg, a process called intracytoplasmic sperm injection).
15. Zhu, supra note 2.
16. MY VIRTUAL MED. CTR., supra note 5.
17. See, e.g., The Associated Press, 8 facts about 'Octomom ' Nadya Suleman, USA TODAY
(Jan. 24, 2014, 5:27 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/24/8-factsoctomom/4816235/ (describing how implementation of twelve embryos resulted in the birth of
octuplets). Nadya Suleman has been given the name "Octomom" because she has given birth to
fourteen children through IVF, six of whom were born through multiple treatments but eight of
whom were a result of implanting twelve embryos. Id.
18. Id.; see also MY VIRTUAL MED. CTR., supra note 5 ("[T]he transfer of more than two
embryos per cycle is discouraged by Australian ethical guidelines.").
19. Zhu, supra note 2.
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cryopreservation. 20 If the implantation in the uterus is successful, the
embryo will grow in the woman as if it was conceived naturally.21
B. Outcomes of In Vitro-Fertilization
The first "test-tube baby," 2 2 Louise Brown, was born in England on
23
July 25, 1978, and was a production of Steptoe's and Edwards's work.
The first baby in the United States to be born via IVF, Elizabeth Carr,
was born 1981.24 Over three million children have been born through the
assistance of IVF. 25 The success rate of IVF treatments has increased due
to scientific discoveries. 2 6 In the 1990s, the pregnancy rate per embryo
transferred to the uterus was 15% compared to 35% in 2008.27 In the
United States in 2013, approximately 1.5% of children born were born
through assisted reproductive technology. 2 8 Since the 1970s, women in
the United States have undergone procedures involving third-party sperm
29
donors, as well as moral and legal issues that followed.
From the beginning, the Roman Catholic Church criticized IVF as
immoral.3 0 The Church saw IVF as unnatural conception and viewed it
with skepticism. 3 1 The "test-tube bab[ies]" were not seen as natural
through the eyes of the public. 3 2 Furthermore, general concerns consisted
of the "depersonalization" of the reproduction process and the destruction
of unused embryos during IVF.33 Despite these critiques, IVF has helped
many couples who were previously unable to conceive children to do
SO.34

During an interview with "Good Morning America," Michelle Obama
revealed that Malia and Sasha, her two daughters, were conceived

20. Zhu, supra note 2.
21. MY VIRTUAL MED. CTR., supra note 5.
22. "Test-tube baby" is a name given to babies born through IVF because the embryo is

created outside of the body, in a lab and then put into the woman's body to finish developing.
Test-tube baby, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionay
/test-tube%20baby (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
23. Zhu, supra note 2.
24. Charis Thompson, IVF global histories, USA: between rock and a marketplace, 2
REPROD. BIOMEDICINE & SoC'y ONLINE 128, 129 (2016), https://www.sciencedirect.com/

science/article/pii/S2405661816300235.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Zhu, supra note 2.
MY VIRTUAL MED. CTR., supra note 5.
MY VIRTUAL MED. CTR., supra note 5.
Thompson, supra note 24, at 131.
Zhu, supra note 2.
Zhu, supra note 2.
Zhu, supra note 2.
Brian, supra note 6.
Thompson, supra note 24, at 131.
MY VIRTUAL MED. CTR., supra note 5.
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through IVF. 3 5 Professional women like Michelle Obama are more likely
to undergo IVF because they can afford it. 36 IVF costs $17,000 on
average but many women pay more depending on how many treatments
it takes for the implantation to be successful. 3 7
During the 1990s, many states began to pass bipartisan legislation
allowing health insurance coverage of IVF. 38 In 15 states, some fertility
procedures are covered through private health insurance plans. 39 Of these
states, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Rhode Island have specific IVF mandates, where private
health insurance companies are required to cover at least some cost of
IVF.4 0 Additionally, Delaware recently passed a bill that requires health
insurance companies to provide at least limited IVF coverage. 4 1 Even in
these states where some coverage is mandatory, many women are still
paying thousands of dollars out-of-pocket. 42
II. IN VITRO-FERTILIZATION AND THE SPERM DONOR
There are three types of sperm donors: (1) Anonymous Donors; (2)
Known Donors; and (3) ID Disclosure Donors. 43 Consider the
hypothetical in the beginning of this Note. Let's name the sperm donor
Chris and the woman Amy. Chris made an anonymous donation to a
sperm bank, accordingly, he would be considered an Anonymous Donor.
Consider another scenario, one in which Amy and Chris are friends,
where Amy approaches Chris and asks him to be the sperm donor. If
Chris agrees, he now will be considered a Known Donor, or a Directed
Donor.44 The final scenario is a compromise between the prior two: Chris
can consent to having his identity revealed to children conceived from his
sperm donation when they reach 21 years old. Here, Chris would be
considered an ID Disclosure Donor.4 5

35. Laura Beers, Michelle Obama's IVF journey could help more women, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11 /13/opinions/michelle-obama-book-ivf-fertility-beers/index.htm

(last updated Nov. 14, 2018).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Thompson, supra note 24, at 131.
39. Thompson, supra note 24, at 132.
40. Thompson, supra note 24, at 132.
41. Beers, supra note 35.
42. Beers, supra note 35.
43. See Donor Types and Vial Types, MANHATTAN CRYOBANK, https://www.manhattan
cryobank.com/donor-sperm/donor-types-and-vial-types/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
44. Id. (explaining "[a] Directed Donor is a donor who is known to the recipient of the

sperm samples.").
45. Id (explaining "[a]n ID Disclosure Donor is a sperm donor who has consented to having
his identity released to children conceived of his specimens when they reach the age of 21.").
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A. Anonymous Sperm Donor
An Anonymous Donor is a sperm donor who does not consent to the
46
release of his identity to any children born from his donation. In other
words, the sperm bank is not allowed to release his identity. 4 7 However,
while the donor has decided against revealing identity at that time, he
48
may still have the opportunity to do so in the future. For example, a
sperm bank in California called Cryobank allows a child of a sperm donor
49
to request information regarding the identity of the biological father.
The child can do so when he or she has reached the age of 18 and only
the child may initiate this contact. 5 0 Cryobank will then contact the donor,
who will decide if he wants to allow Cryobank to reveal his identity to
his biological child. 5 1 Anonymous sperm donation provides the sperm
donor with the ultimate decision to remain anonymous or not.
B. Known or DirectedSperm Donor
In some cases, the donor is anonymous. In other cases, the donor is a
friend of the recipient, or a "known donor." In this case, Amy's child will
know her biological father, Chris, affording them the potential for a
lifelong connection. Lawyers recommend that the donor and recipient
52
explore the involvement of the known donor in the child's life. It is also
recommended to keep in mind that the parties' intentions can change over
time.5 3 For instance, the donor may want contact now, but this could
54
change if the donor later starts a family of his own or for other reasons.
Because of this, it is important that the sperm donor and the recipient
consult an attorney to draft the rights of the relationship with the future
child. 5 5 Legal issues often arise when the intent of the parties is unclear.
For instance, in our second scenario, with "Known Donor Chris," it is
possible that Chris did not want to be involved paternally in his child's
life. He simply was a friend who supplied the sperm. On the other hand,
Amy may have wanted Chris to be involved from the beginning. Because
46. Id.
47. Eg., id.
48. Eg., Donor Types, CAL. CRYROBANK, https://cryobank.com/how-it-works/donor-types/
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Deborah Forman, Using a Known Sperm Donor: Understandingthe Legal Risks and

Challenges, PATH2PARENTHOOD (May 9, 2011), http://www.path2parenthood.org/article/usinga-known-sperm-donor-understanding-the-legal-risks-and-challenges.

53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Sarah Tipton, Does a Known Sperm Donor Have Any ParentalRights or Obligations?,
MATCH, https://www.legamatch.com/law-library/article/sperm-donor-parental-rights

LEGAL

obligations.html (last modified June 28, 2018, 1:42 PM).
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of the ambiguity in these situations, it is very possible that Amy could
sue Chris for child support and win, even though Chris never intended or
wanted to be considered the father. 56 In the reverse situation, Chris may
want to support the child but Amy might not want him involved at all.
Because of their friendship, the court could order Chris paternity rights
or even custody of the child despite the mother's refusal.
IVF has the potential to lead to a confusing array of possible parents.
For example, if a couple obtains both the sperm and eggs from donors,
the couple would not be biologically related to the child. In this example,
who would be considered the legal parents, the biological couple or the
intentional couple? This Note focuses some on the anonymous sperm
donor but significantly considers the legal issues that arise from known
sperm donations.
III. SPERM DONOR LAWS

State laws vary regarding sperm donors and their parental rights.5 7
Some states provide that if a donor is not the mother's husband, then his
rights to the child are non-existent-a scenario found in many marital
presumption cases.5 8 The marital presumption exists in all states, either
by common law or statute, and holds that there is a rebuttable
presumption that a husband is the father of his wife's children. 59 This
presumption supports the idea that what matters most is not the father's
biological connection with the child, but instead the father's relationship
with the mother. 6 0 In most states during the 1950s and 60s, unmarried
fathers had no legal rights to their children whatsoever. 6 1 However, the
Supreme Court has since held that an unmarried father's rights to his
children are entitled to constitutional protection. 62
An anonymous donor to a sperm bank, usually signs away his right to
the child before donating. 63 Even though these outcomes are typical for
56. See, e.g., Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 862 (N.M. CL App. 2008) (holding that where
the biological father goes beyond merely donating sperm and assumes a parental role, he is liable
for child support).
57. Tipton, supra note 55.

58. See Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, 45 Misc. 3d 574, 577 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (stating that
public policy strongly favors legitimacy of children, and that the presumption that a child born to
a marriage is the child of both parents in the marriage is one of the strongest and persuasive public
policy known to law).
59. Katharine K. Baker, Bargainingor Biology? The Historyand Future ofPaternityLaw

and ParentalStatus, 14 CORNELL J.L& PUB. POL'Y 1, 12 (2004).
60. Id. at 2; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 154 (1989) (giving deference
to the husband of the mother instead of the biological father when determining paternal rights).
61. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAw 328 (West Acad. Pub., 4th

ed. 2015).
62. Id.
63. Tipton, supra note 55.
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anonymous sperm donors, for known donors, common law, state laws,
and the Uniform Parentage Act are inconsistent. Because of these
inconsistencies, many issues arise as to whether a sperm donor has
parental rights to his child born through IVF.
A. Uniform ParentageAct
The Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA") was enacted in 1973 to clarify
the ambiguities concerning unwed fathers and the lack of laws for sperm
donors. 64 During this time, Supreme Court decisions held that it was
unconstitutional to discriminate against children born outside of marriage
and to deny legal parental rights to fathers not married to the child's
mother. 6 5 The UPA was the result of the emerging non-traditional family
norms and was an attempt to standardize state laws regulating
parentage. 6 6 However, the original language of the UPA mentioned only
married women using sperm donors and excluded unmarried women:
"[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a marriedwoman other than the donor's wife is treated
67
in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived."
Therefore, the original UPA did not regulate situations in which a donor
donates to single woman, like Amy.
Accordingly, legal issues developed regarding this scenario. For
example, in C.M v. C. C.,68 a 1977 case regarding a sperm donation to a
single woman, the court ruled the sperm donor was the father with
paternal rights. It reasoned that it is in the "child's best interests to have
two parents whenever possible"-an important standard in paternity
cases that will be further discussed later in this Note. 69 After this ruling,
known donors could be subject to liability for all parental responsibilities
and obligations.
Furthermore, the 1973 version of the UPA does not allow paternal
recognition of the sperm donor when the semen was ". . . provided to a
licensedphysician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman
other than the donor's wife. ... "70 Under this language, if other means
besides a licensed physician was used for the insemination, for example

64. Joanna L. Grossman, Friends with Benefits: Texas Man Who Donated Sperm to a
FriendHas ParentalRights, JUSTIA VERDICT (Nov. 29, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/11/
29/friends-benefits-texas-man-donated-sp'erm-friend-parental-rights.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§ 5(b)

(NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS

1973) (emphasis added).
68. 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. J. & D.R. Ct. 1977).
69. Id. at 825.
70. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973) (emphasis added).
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if the parties performed the procedure on their own, then the sperm donor
could be found to have paternal rights. 7 1
In 2009, William Marotta answered a Craigslist add for a sperm donor
for a same-sex couple, Angie Bauer and Jennifer Schreiner. 72 The parties
entered into a written agreement wherein Marotta waived his parental
rights. 73 Upon the couple's separation when the child was three years old,
the biological mother went to the state of Kansas for help and the state
contacted Marotta for child support. 74 In 2009, Kansas had adopted the
1973 version of the UPA that required a licensed physician for the
insemination. 75 However, Marotta and the couple did not use such a
physician. 7 6 He donated his sperm directly to the couple, who performed
the procedure by themselves. 77 Because Marotta did not follow the 1973
version of the UPA by using a licensed physician for the insemination,
he was not afforded its protection, despite their written agreement. 78
Therefore, he was still considered the father and was forced to pay child
support. 79 CNN Senior Medical Correspondent Elizabeth Cohen stated
that, "[h]ad a physician carried out the insemination, that would not be
the case, because Marotta would be able to document that he was a sperm
donor and not the lover of the girl's mother." 8 0 Cohen implies that having
the "licensed physician" requirement is a way to document the donation
and determine that Marotta had not been in a relationship with the
biological mother where the child could have been conceived through
intercourse, a scenario in which Marotta would not be able to dodge child
support.
This case represents the problem in those states that have adopted the
1973 version of the UPA. The 1973 version overlooks the fact that many
people cannot afford artificial insemination through a licensed physician
because it can cost about three thousand dollars. 8 1 It allows protection for
those who can afford it but ignores the fact that many cannot. Taking
71. Stephen J. Staple, The Craigslist Father: Uncertain Law and Outcomes for Known
Donors 3 (2013) (unpublished seminar paper, Michigan State University College of Law) (on file
with Michigan State University), https://www.law.msu.edu/king/2012-2013/Staple.pdf.
72. Id. at 2.

73. Id.
74. Kansas hits up sperm donorfor child support, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/04/
us/kansas-sperm-donation (last updated Jan. 23, 2014, 8:36 PM).
75.

UNF. PARENTAGE ACT

§

5(b) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON

UNIF.

STATE LAWS

1973).
76. Staple, supra note 71, at 3.
77. Staple, supra note 71, at 3.
78. CNN, supra note 74.
79. See CNN, supra note 74.
80. CNN, supra note 74.
81. Elissa Strauss, 40 years later, why is IVF still not covered by insurance? Economics,
ignorance and sexism, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/25/health/ivf-insurance-parentingstrauss/index.html (last updated July 25, 2018, 12:48 PM); see also CNN, supra note 74.
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these situations into consideration, the UPA was revised in 2000 and
amended in 2002. The legislature again updated in 2017 to apply equally
to same-sex couples and is not very different compared to the 2002

version. 82
Section 702 of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2017 states that, "[a]
83
donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction."
This section completely bars the parental rights of a donor, whether the
recipient is married or unmarried. 84 However, § 703 states that, "[a]n
individual who consents under Section 704 to assisted reproduction by a
woman with the intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted
reproduction is a parent of the child." 85 Due to this section, it is possible
for known donors to have parental rights depending on the intent of the
donor. The consent needed for this to occur under § 704, "must be in a
record signed by a woman giving birth to a child conceived by assisted
86
reproduction and an individual.who intends to be a parent of the child."
Furthermore, if the parties do not consent pursuant to § 704(a), parentage
can still be established under the UPA if the, "woman or the individual
proves by clear-and-convincing evidence the existence of an express
agreement entered into before conception that the individual and the
87
woman intended they both would be parents of the child," or "if for the
first two years of the child's life, the individual resided together in the
same household with the child and both openly held out the child as the

individual's child." 88

It is clear from this language that written consent from both parties
gives the most protection, and the courts will honor what the parties
decide in writing. However, it is trickier when there is no written consent,
and the parties have to rely on an express agreement before conception
under § 704 to establish parentage. Parties that do not consent in writing
have to prove the express agreement by clear and convincing evidence,
which is a high burden on the parties. 89 Some courts have strictly applied
written consent requirements, producing results that are inequitable and
harmful to the child.9 0 Other courts, however, rely on common law
91
doctrines such as public policy arguments to do justice in such cases.

82. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§

103 CMT. (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE

§

702 (2017).

§
§
§
§

703 (2017).
704(a) (2017).
704(b)(1) (2017).
704 CMT (2017).

LAWS 2017).
83.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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In re Parentage of MJ.9 2 discussed the relationship between
Raymond Banary and Alexis Mitchell, who gave birth to twins through
artificial insemination. 93 The donor, Banary, was a friend of Alexis for
over ten years. 94 Mitchell asked the court for child support. 9 5 This case
considered whether the lack of a written agreement prevents the
establishment of a parent-child relationship and the burden of child
support.9 6 Even though the court established that the written consent
requirement precluded the obligation of child support, the court also
looked at the enforcement of a support obligation through an estoppel, or
waiver theory and decided that the lack of a written agreement did not bar
further inquiry into the parties' decision to use artificial insemination. 97
The court held that Banary is considered a parent under common law
principles because it found that through his alleged conduct, Banary
consented to using his sperm for the artificial insemination. 98 The court
reasoned that to find otherwise would deprive the children of financial
support simply because of a technicality.9
Most states have adopted a version of the UPA. The 2017 version of
the UPA has only been enacted in three states-California, Vermont and
Washington-but it has also been introduced in Connecticut and
Pennsylvania.' 00 The 2000 version of the UPA has been adopted in 11
states.101 Additionally, 14 states have adopted the 1973 version of the
UPA. 0 2 Considering the differences between each version of the Act, the
outcome of each case in different states can vary. Additionally, a few
states lack any statutory authority for sperm donors, which results in even
more unbalanced decisions regarding these issues.
B. FloridaState Laws on Sperm Donors
The state laws and courts that have considered parentage issues have
formed statutes, which attempt to reconcile these sperm donor parentage
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

787 N.E.2d 144 (I1. 2003).
Id at 146.
Id.
Id at 147.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 150, 152.

98. In re ParentageofMJ., 787 N.E.2d at 152.

99. Id
100. ParentageAct, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last updated Mar.
15, 2019).
101. Parentage Act (2002), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=5d5c48d6-623f-4d01-9994-6933ca8af315
(last
visited Mar. 18, 2019).
102. ParentageAct (1973), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=10720858-ebe1-4e85-a275-40210e3f3f87

visited Mar. 18, 2019).
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issues. For example, Florida's state law contains a chapter titled
"Determination of Parentage."1 03 In this chapter, § 742.14 of Florida
Statutes (2018) states that, "[t]he donor of any egg, sperm, or
preembryo . .. shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and
1
obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting children." 04
Accordingly, Florida takes the stance that a sperm donor has no parental
rights and Florida cases have reinforced that position.105 However, this
law does not include the sperm donor of the "commissioning couple or a
father who has executed a preplanned adoption agreement.. . ." 6 In all,
the Florida statutes simply allow paternal obligations only in sperm donor
cases with a couple or a father with an adoption agreement. If this is not
the case, then the sperm donor does not have any parental rights under
this statute.
The problem with this analysis is that it does not account for situations
in which giving the sperm donor parental rights could be in the best
interests of the child. The statute fails to address this circumstance. What
if the sperm donor, like Chris, is a genuine person who could be a great
father figure? What if his living situation could benefit the child who may
not be in the best financial circumstances? This is what the state statute
misses because it denies any parental right to the sperm donor despite
their situation and the best interests of the child. A more recent Florida
case sheds some light on this issue.
In a 2013 case regarding an egg donation to a birth mother, who was
previously in a same-sex relationship with the. donor, the egg donor filed
07
a petition to establish parental rights after the couple split.1 The Florida
Supreme Court determined that the mother was a "donor" pursuant to
§ 742.14 of the Florida Statutes.1 0 8 If the Court stopped here, the egg
donor would not have a parental claim to the child because under the
statute she relinquished all maternal rights when she donated her egg.
However, the Court took another approach to this situation and looked at
the constitutionality of the statute. 9 The Court concluded that the egg
donor's right to maintain a relationship with her biological child was a
fundamental right deserving protection through the Due Process Clauses
of the Florida and United States Constitutions, along with Florida's
constitutional privacy provision. 1 0 Accordingly, the state did not have a
compelling interest in depriving the egg donor of her right to be a
103. FLA. STAT.
104. FLA. STAT.

§ 742 (2018).
§ 742.14(2018).

105. See, e.g., A.A.B v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Lamaritata
v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
106. See Janssen v. Alicea, 30 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
107. D.M.T. v. T.M.H, 129 So. 3d 320, 327 (Fla. 2013).
108. Id. at 333.
109. Id. at 332.
110. Id. at 340.
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parent."' In the Court's analysis, it was helpful that the donor and the
birth mother lived together as a couple, and jointly assumed rights and
responsibilities for their daughter after her birth." In this case, Florida
found a way to allow parentage despite its lack of statutes covering this
scenario. Even though this situation involves an egg donor and not a
sperm donor, it still applies to sperm donations because it interprets the
same relevant statute.
IV. IMPORTANT COMMON LAW ANALYSES AND INCONSISTENCIES

The UPA attempts to resolve all artificial insemination parentage
disputes. However, as previously stated, not all states have adopted the
UPA and many lack authority that deals with parental rights of sperm
donors." 3 The states that have not adopted the UPA are forced to rely on
common law principles.' 1 4 Even the states that follow the UPA still run
into ambiguities. For example, when the parties do not have written
consent pursuant to § 704, the parties have to follow the high burden of
proving parentage by clear and convincing evidence." 5 The case-by-case
analysis of this burden has resulted in inconsistent case holdings."1 6
Courts consider what is in the best interest of the public. In the
circumstances of sperm donors, what would be the best interest of the
public? Would upholding agreements be? What about the best interest of
the child? Besides the language in the UPA, courts look at public policy
arguments to determine outcomes of these cases. Some states look at the
intent of the parties and take the child's best interest into consideration to
determine the outcome of the paternity battle of the sperm donor, while
other courts focus on the agreement between the donor and the biological
mother. Below, different analyses of sperm donor parentage found in case
law are discussed, highlighting the inconsistencies of these different
standards.
A. The Intent of Parties
When states face ambiguities within the UPA or their state laws
regarding parentage, they sometimes look at the intent of the parties
111. Id. at 341.
112. Id.
113. Staple, supra note 71, at 4.
114. Staple, supra note 71, at 4.
115. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Parentage of M.J, 787

N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 2003); Mintz v. Zoemig, 198 P.3d 861 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); In re Thomas S. v.
Robin Y, 209 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa.
2007).
116. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Parentage of M.J, 787
N.E.2d 144 (I1. 2003); Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); In re Thomas S. v.
Robin Y, 209 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa.
2007).
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involved. Johnson v. Calvert" 7 was one of the first cases to discuss the
intent of the parties, or intent-based parentage.' 8 This California
surrogate case arose from an agreement between a married couple, the
Calverts, and Anna Johnson." 9 The couple arranged for Anna to be
impregnated with their embryo, carry it to term, and for her to relinquish
her parental rights to the child upon birth in exchange for $10,000.120
During the pregnancy, the couple and Anna's relationship deteriorated
and both parties sought for parental rights of the unborn child.1 2 1 The
court noted that the couple intended that the child be born through 1VF
and that "[b]ut for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist."122
Further, the court stated that the aim of the agreement between the parties
was to bring the Calverts' child into the world, not for the Calverts to
donate a zygote to Anna.1 23 In sum, because the intent of the parties was
for Anna to carry the Calverts' child to term and to exclude Anna's
parental rights, the court ruled in the couple's favor.1 2 4
This intent-based parentage analysis has been used in many other
cases over the years. In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y12s describes how this
intent-based parentage analysis is used in sperm donor situations. 126 in
this case, a lesbian couple met Thomas Steel, who agreed to be a known
donor for the couple, but no written agreement was ever signed.1 2 7 There
were approximately twenty-six visits between Steel and the child over the
years.1 2 8 The couple eventually wanted the visits to stop. In response,
Steel moved for an order of filiation and visitation rights.1 29 When the
court analyzed the parental rights of Steel, it looked at the intent of the
parties rather than the oral agreement they had made.'3 0 The court looked
to the functional relationship between the mother and sperm donor.1 3 1
Through their relationship and actions, they exhibited mutual intent to
have the biological father assume a paternal role in the child's life. 3 2
Because there was no concrete written agreement, the court was able to
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
See id. at 782.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id.

122. Id. at 782.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
Id.
209 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
See id. at 315.
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id. at 300.

130. Jesse Michael Nix, "You Only Donated Sperm": Using Intent to Uphold Paternity

Agreements, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 487,490 (2009).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 490-91.
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reject the oral agreement the parties had and use the intent based analysis

instead. 33

A more recent case also discussed the intent-based parentage. In
Ferguson v. McKiernan,134 the parties were intimate partners for some
time, but McKiernan consistently refused to marry Ferguson or bear a
child with her through IVF.13 5 Only when Ferguson promised to release
him from any of the financial burdens associated with paternity and
agreed that she would raise the child alone, did McKiernan consent to
becoming her sperm donor. 136 During the pregnancy, McKiernan and
Ferguson remained friends without any romantic relationship. 3 7
McKiernan later married another woman and had two kids of his own. 3 8
Even so, Ferguson sought child support after the birth of twins as a result
of the IVF through McKiernan's sperm donation. 13 9 The question
presented in this case was whether a mother and sperm donor could enter
an agreement for IVF, where the donor relinquishes his right to visitation
with the resultant child in return for .the mother's agreement to not seek
child support. 140 The court considered the oral agreement and actions of
both, the sperm donor and the mother, to determine the intent of the
parties and to conclude that McKiernan did not owe child support to
Ferguson.1 4 1 For example, Ferguson told McKiernan that she would not
ask for child support; they attempted to hide McKiernan's biological
relationship from close family and friends; additionally, McKiernan and
Ferguson acted in accordance with their initial agreement for five years
after the birth of the twins.14 2 The court found that this was enough to
prove that the parties never intended for McKiernan to have any parental
rights. 4 3
In Mintz v. Zoernig,'44 the court faced the issue of whether a known
sperm donor is responsible for child support when there was a predonation agreement, releasing the donor from all associated financial
obligations.1 45 The donor ultimately donated twice per the mother's
request and biologically fathered two children.1 4 6 After the birth of the
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 491.
940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
Id. at 1239.
Id.
Id. at 1240.

138. Id. at 1241.
139. Id. at 1240.

140. Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1242.
141. See id. at 1248.
142. Nix, supra note 130, at 492.

143.
144.
145.
146.

See Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1248.
198 P.3d 861 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 862.
See id.
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children, the father had significant contact with them, but the mother
47
served as the primary parent and the donor did not pay child support.1
Eventually, the mother filed a paternity action, seeking child support for
the children.1 4 8 Despite the agreement releasing the father of financial
responsibility for the children, the court concluded that because he held
himself out to be the children's father through regular visits, and because
he acknowledged that he is the natural father, he was liable for child
support.1 4 9 Even though the parties agreed to one thing before the birth of
the children, their actions and intentions when the children were born
50
indicated another, and the court found their actions to be dispositive.
B. ContractingAway Their Rights
In addition to looking at the intent of parties, courts will sometimes
determine that the agreements between parties should be upheld because
of the importance to protect contractual rights. People are allowed the
freedom of contract, therefore, they can contract their parental rights in
sperm donor cases. Contract law is another avenue of analysis that the
court uses to determine the outcome of these cases. The case of Ferguson
v. McKiernan,15 1 discussed above, sheds some light on this analysis. The
case looked at the contract between the parties, to determine the intent of
the parties, and gave insight to the importance of the contractual rights of
the parties.'5 2 The court stated that if the two parties could not contract to
remove the paternity rights of a known sperm donor:
[I]t would mean that a woman who wishes to have a baby
but is unable to conceive through intercourse could not seek
sperm from a man she knows and admires, while assuring
him that he will never be subject to a support order and being
herself assured that he will never be able to see custody of
the child. Accordingly, to protect herself and the sperm
donor, that would-be mother would have no choice but to
resort to anonymous donation or abandon her desire to be a
biological mother, notwithstanding her considered personal
preference to conceive using the sperm of someone familiar,
whose background, traits, and medical history are not
shrouded in mystery. To much the same end, where a wouldbe donor cannot trust that he is safe from a future support
action, he will be considerably less likely to provide his
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 864.
Mintz, 198 P.3d at 864.
940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
Id. at 1242.
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sperm to a friend or acquaintance who asks, significantly
limiting a would-be mother's reproductive prerogatives.15 3
The court in Ferguson ultimately decided that the agreement between
the parties should be considered over the interest of the children in the
decision to afford child support." 4 Specifically, the court recognized that
to rule in favor of McKiernan' denies support to two children "who did
not ask to be born into this situation," but the court further reasoned that
absent the parties' agreement the twins would not have been born at all.' 55
This contractual approach offers the court a way to determine what
should be done in paternity cases where the donor and mother used an
oral or written agreement.1 56 To use this approach, the parties must prove
that an agreement was created. 5 7 To demonstrate this, one party must
show that he or she relied on the agreement.1 58 For instance, one court
ruled that a non-biologically related man was considered a father because
the mother relied on his conduct and assurance that he would support the
child.1 59 Another court ruled that a man who acted like the father for two
years and the mother relied on such commitment was the father.1 6 0
Essentially, the parentage of children under this standard would be
decided through the realms of contract law where there is an offer,
acceptance, and consideration.
Should we allow parental rights to be established through contract
law? If so, what other rights would we be able to contract away? As stated
by Marjorie Shultz, our society favors the fulfillment of individual
purpose and the freedom of individual choice and liberty.' 6 ' Many oppose
parentage through contract law and reason that contracts may be at odds
with children's welfare, that the contract results in the commodification
of children and, further, that IVF exploits women. 162 However, if we do
not honor paternity contracts, will that deter future mothers from
undergoing IVF who would prefer to form a contract with a known donor,
instead of going the anonymous route? Additionally, would we be
undermining the force of contract law by not upholding these
agreements? Contracts, as Sarah Abramowicz argues, would enable
153. Id. at 1247.
154. See id. at 1248.

155. Id.
156. Nix, supra note 130, at 493.
157. Nix, supra note 130, at 493
158. Nix, supra note 130, at 493.

159. Nix, supranote 130, at 493-94 (citing Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 83 (Md. 2000)).
160. Nix, supra note 130, at 493 (citing Perkins v. Perkins, 383 A:2d 634, 634, 636 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977)).
161. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:An
Opportunityfor GenderNeutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 327 (1990).
162. Sarah Abramowicz, ContractualizingCustody, 83 FoRDHAM L. REV. 67, 114 (2014).
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parents to provide their families with stability, security and freedom from
government intervention, which would serve the welfare of both the
63
children and the parents.1
C. The Best Interests of The Child
Even though enforcing the agreement of the parties involved in sperm
donation is an important public policy, it is not the only one. Some courts
also look at what are the best interests of the child and many have
determined that the interests of the child is the most important public
policy to consider in these circumstances. In agreement with this
argument, Martha Ertman wrote that "contracts affecting children are not
enforceable in the way that most other contracts are enforceable,
primarily because the State has an interest in safeguarding the best
interests of children that trumps the parties' intentions." 64 Additionally,
Justice Eakin's dissenting opinion in Ferguson states that the primary
5
concern in child support proceedings in the best interests of the child.
Further, Eakin concludes that:
[t]his private contract involves traditional support
principles not abrogated by the means chosen by the parents
to inseminate the mother, and I would apply the well-settled
precedent that the best interest of the child controls. A parent
cannot bargain away the children's right to support. These
children have a right to support from both parents, including
the man who is not an anonymous sperm donor, but their
father.1 6 6
In addition to the Justice Eakin's dissent, the majority in C.M. v.
C. C.1 67 ruled that the best interests of the child is the right public policy
to follow.1 68 C.M. donated sperm to C.C. during a time when they were
dating and contemplating marriage. 169 Despite their relationship, both
170 C.M. assumed he
parties had different intentions regarding the child.
would act as a father toward the child but C.C. testified that C.M. was
only to be a visitor; at this point, the relationship between the two broke
off.' 7 1 The court was then to decide whether C.M. is the father of the child
163. Id. at 129.
164. Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved
Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 23 (2003).

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1249 (Pa. 2007) (Eakins, J., dissenting).
Id at 1251 (Eakins, J., dissenting).
377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. J. & D.R. Ct. 1977).
See id. at 825.
Id. at 821.
See id. at 822.
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or whether he is not simply because the sperm used was not transferred
to C.C. through intercourse.1 72 The court reinforced the public policy of
the child's best interest by stating:
It is in a child's best interests to have two parents whenever
possible. The court takes no position as to the propriety of
the use of artificial insemination between unmarried persons,
but must be concerned with the best interest of the child in
granting custody or visitation, and for such consideration
will not make any distinction between a child conceived
naturally or artificially. In this situation a man wants to take
upon himself the responsibility of being a father to a child he
is responsible for helping to conceive.1 7 3
The court further discussed how C.M. is not an unfit father and has
shown a genuine interest in the child.1 74 Further, the court noted that he
is a teacher and is financially capable of contributing to the support of the
child. 175 Through this reasoning, the court held that C.M. is the natural
father of the child and was entitled to visitation rights.1 7 6
In child custody cases resulting from divorce, the court considers a
number of factors to determine the best interests of the child that include
but are not limited to: (1) the physical and emotional needs of the child;
(2) capability and desire of the parents to meet the child's need; (3) the
child's preference; and (4) any evidence of domestic violence, child
abuse, or neglect.1 7 7 The state's interest in the interests of children
potentially conflicts with the parents' private right of contract law. For
example, a woman contracts with a known sperm donor to use his sperm
and for him to not be involved in the child's life. However, the court uses
these factors to determine that it is in the child's best interest for the sperm
donor to be the father, therefore, the sperm donor is given parental rights,
thus undermining any contract the parties might have had that stated other
intentions.
Additionally, the best interest standard could potentially give rights to
donors who were never intended to have rights. An example of this
situation can be found more clearly in surrogacy cases, where the
surrogate mother may have more money, more stability, or may be in a
better situation all around than the intended parents. This standard could
172. Id.
173. C.M, 377 A.2d at 825.
174. Id.

175. Id.
176. Id
177. Katherine M. Swift, ParentingAgreements, the Potential Power of Contract, and the

Limits of FamilyLaw, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 941 (2007) (citing ALASKA STAT.
(2004)).

§ 25.24.150(c)
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remove newborns from the custody of their biological parents simply
because they are poor and transfer parental rights to someone with greater
financial stability.1 7 8 Should we give the surrogate mother the rights to
the child because it may be in the best interests of the child to do so?
Should we allow such a standard that could potentially permit such a
slippery slope?
V. WHAT IS THE PROPER ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE
PARENTAL RIGHTS?

The different analyses and outcomes of these cases confirm the
proposition to have more uniformity throughout the states. Should the
UPA be mandatory for all states? Should we allow paternity rights to be
contracted? Should we solely look at the parties' intent? Or should we
simply look at what is in the best interest of the child? I recommend that
all states should adopt the 2017 version of the UPA. Or, in the alternative,
if states do not adopt this version, the courts should follow a "pyramid
test" when determining the paternity rights of fathers in sperm donor
cases.
First, as discussed before, the 2017 UPA tries to consider all potential
situations in regard to sperm donations. For example, it first looks at the
intent of the parties when one consents to donating his sperm.1 7 9 Further,
it provides that consent must be in writing and signed by the woman who
is using the donated sperm. 180 Even when there is no written agreement,
the newest version of the UPA will then look at whether there was an
express agreement between the parties and what they both intended the
sperm donor's role in the child's life would be.181 If this cannot be proven
by clear and convincing evidence, the UPA looks to see if the sperm
donor resided together in the same household for the first two years and
held the donor out as the child's father.18 2
By following the UPA, if there is an express agreement, the court will
rule pursuant to it. 183 It honors the agreement of parties, while also taking
into account their intentions. 184 It awards a father's paternity right when
they have had played a role in the child's life, by holding them out as
their own. 18 5

178. Michael W. Austin, Rights and Obligations of Parents,

INT, ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,

https://www.iep.utm.edu/parentri/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).

179. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (NAT'L CONFERENCE
2017).
180. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(a) (2017).
181. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b)(1) (2017).
182. UNIF. PARENTAGE
183. UNIF. PARENTAGE
184. UNIF. PARENTAGE
185. UNIF. PARENTAGE

ACT
ACT
ACT
ACT

§ 704 CMT (2017).
§ 704(b)(1) (2017).
§ 704(b) (2017).
§ 704(b)(2) (2017).
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For those states that do not follow the UPA, I propose that they should
follow a "pyramid test." At the top of the pyramid is the right to contract.
In the next two tiers are the parties' intentions/actions and the best interest.
of the child, respectively. First, the court should look at whether the
parties have formed a contract. Next, the court should look at the intent,
or actions of the parties. For example, the court will look at whether the
sperm donor has been playing a role as the father. If there is a contract,
and the parties' actions or intentions conform to it, then the court should
honor it. If there is no proof of a contract, but the parties' intentions are
aligned, then the court should stop there and rule in favor of their
intentions. However, if there is no proof of a contract, and the intentions
of the parties are not in line, then the court should look at the best interests
of the child and rule accordingly. Additionally, if the contract and the
intentions conflict, the court should then also consider the best interests
of the child. The judge will have the final say on what is indeed in the
child's best interests.
According to Michael Austin, because the best interests of the child
standard does not also weigh the interests of the parents in a proper
manner, it seems to be an unfair standard based on monetary and
materialistic principles that gives a child to those with greater finances.1 8 6
Additionally, scholars greatly reject a system in which the government
would have the power to determine who is fit to raise a child.1 87
Therefore, under this test, the contract will outweigh the bests interests of
the child by default unless there is any conflict between the contract and
the parties' intentions. When considering the best interests of the child,
the court would not issue parentage to a sperm donor who could have
their paternity rights evoked in other cases (drug use, abuse, etc.). By
considering these public policies, the court does not overlook any option.
Consider Amy and Known Donor Chris again. If they contracted their
rights and Chris is not to have any paternal rights, then the contract should
be honored. However, if the intent of the parties does not line up with the
contract, for example, if Chris is holding himself out at the child's father,
or taking a paternal role in the child's life, then the court will look into
what the best interests of the child is. If Chris is a decent person, who has
an income, no substantial criminal record or history of domestic violence,
the court may rule him as the father. However, if Chris has a history of
abuse or drug use, the court could rule that he is not.
Unfortunately for "Anonymous Donor Chris," he does not have any
luck for paternity rights under the pyramid test, because he contracted his
rights away. Additionally, Amy might not have proceeded with IVF but
for his doing so. Therefore, Chris would not be able to assert his paternity
186.

Austin, supra note 178.
187. Abramowicz, supra note 162, at 127.
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rights, even though he may be able to provide for the children, maybe
even more so than Amy. This approach honors the parties' contractual
rights and protects a woman who wants to raise a child on her own
through IVF.
In the Craigslist donor case involving the sperm donor found through
Craigslist and the same-sex couple, the sperm donor would not have been
considered the father under this approach. 188 In this case, the parties had
an agreement and their intentions lined up with the agreement. Therefore,
the analysis should have stopped there. My proposal takes the shape of a
pyramid, giving the most weight to contracts, where there is one, while
also recognizing the parties' actions and the best interests of the child for
support if necessary.
CONCLUSION

With the increasing amount of technology, the law must adapt
accordingly. IVF is a new approach that allows single mothers, or couples
with fertility issues, the opportunity to still have a child. Despite its
controversial beginnings, IVF has resulted in over three million births.
But unforeseen paternity debates followed IVF and the courts have ruled
inconsistently.
Honoring contracts, looking at intent, and determining the best
interests of the child are all important public policies and have been used
to determine paternity for many reasons. Courts have historically used
one or the other. However, they are all important. Protecting the freedom
to contract allows a mother to undergo IVF and use a known donor
without the worry that their agreement would not hold up. Looking at the
parties' actions allows us to see into their intentions and it is important
for courts to follow them. One of the most important public policies is
considering the child's best interests because it protects children, who do
not have the power to protect themselves. By following the proposed
"pyramid," states should take all these public policies into account when
determining paternity in sperm donor cases.

188. See supra Part IV.A.
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The University of FloridaJournal of Law & Public Policy is an
interdisciplinary organization whose primary purpose is the publication of
scholarly articles on contemporary legal and social issues facing public
policy decisionmakers. The Journal is composed of two governing
bodies: the Advisory Board and the Executive Board. The Advisory Board
is comprised of faculty and honorary members who provide independent
guidance. The Executive Board, which includes both law and graduate
students, is responsible for researching and preparing each volume for
publication. The Executive Board also selects the articles that are
published. All student members must complete a writing requirement and
help research and prepare the Journalfor publication.

The Journal thanks Marjorie A. Niblack and the Office of
Instructional Resources, University of Florida, for the use of the Century
Tower graphic on the back cover.
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